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ABSTRACT 
Start-up businesses often need external financing to grow. These new ventures frequently tum 
to business angel investors for capital. Angels, who are often wealthy individuals, provide 
early stage financing, called seed capital, for these start-up ventures. This study examines 
what a group of angel investors in Southern California consider when reviewing an 
investment opportunity, and how they prioritize their investment criteria. The study utilizes a 
two-phase approach consisting of a qualitative first phase and a quantitative second phase. 
The results of this study show that trustworthiness of the entrepreneur, quality of the 
management team, enthusiasm of the lead entrepreneur, and exit opportunities for the angel 
are the angels ' top criteria. 
INTRODUCTION 
This study examines what business angel 
investors consider when reviewing an 
investment opportunity, and how they 
prioritize their investment criteria. Angel 
investors, who are often wealthy individuals 
with experience building a business, provide 
early stage financing, called seed capital, for 
start-up ventures. Venture capitalists (VCs) 
typically provide later stage financing, after 
the angels' investment. 
Many start-up businesses need external 
financing to grow (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; 
Hisrich & Jankowicz, 1990). If these new 
ventures anticipate quick and aggressive 
growth, they often turn to angel or venture 
capital investors for capital. Angels invest 
more funds in more firms than any other 
source of outside financing (Freear, Sohl, & 
Wetzel, 1992). Although it is hard to 
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estimate the exact size of angel investment 
due to its highly fragmented nature, in 2004 
it was reported to total $22.5 billion (Sohl, 
2005). This estimate puts total angel 
investments higher than formal venture 
capital investing for 2004 (Sohl, 2005). 
Angel investing has provided seed capital for 
some famous U.S. businesses such as Bell 
Telephone in 1874, Ford Motor Company in 
1903, and Apple Computer in 1977 (Van 
Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000). 
Entrepreneurial ventures dramatically affect 
the U.S. economy and are the primary job-
creating engine of our economy, providing 
three out of four new jobs (Ojala, 2002). To 
put this in perspective, it is estimated that 
new business start-ups averaged 
approximately 550,000 per month between 
1996 and 2004 (Kauffman Foundation, 
2005). The Small Business Administration 
estimates that 51 percent of private sector 
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output is from small business (Van 
Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000). Between 
1995 to 1999, the Inc. 500 (the 500 fastest 
growing privately held companies in the U.S. 
reported by Inc. magazine) created 6 million 
of 7. 7 million new jobs (Van Osnabrugge & 
Robinson, 2000). Clearly entrepreneurial 
businesses are a powerhouse in the U.S. 
economy. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most of the literature which addresses the 
start-up investment decision process has 
focused on how VCs make investment 
decisions. (Elitzur & Gavious, 2003; Mason 
& Harrison, 2002). There has been little 
attention given to angel investors in the 
literature due to its private fragmented 
nature. In fact, to the author's knowledge, 
this is the first empirical study addressing 
U.S. Angel investment criteria. It has been 
difficult to locate and survey angels (Mason 
& Harrison, 2002). However, since the late 
1990s, angels have started to form 
organizations that help coordinate their 
efforts (Kauffman Foundation, 2002). Also, 
we can draw from the venture capital 
literature for angel investors due to some 
similarity of the investment process by 
angels and VCs. However, let us start with 
the differences between angel and VCs. 
An important difference in the process 
between how angels and VCs invest is that 
VCs perform more due diligence than 
angels: "a recent study found that 71 percent 
of venture capitalists, but only eight percent 
of business angels, take three or more 
references, with the two groups averaging 
around four and one respectively" (Van 
Osnabrugge, 1998). Angels perform less 
professional due diligence than VCs, invest 
more opportunistically, rely more on 
instincts, and do not calculate internal rates 
of return (Timmons, 1990; Baty, 1991; 
Mason & Harrison, 1996; Van Osnabrugge 
& Robinson, 2000). VCs may have a staff of 
people to perform due diligence or may hire 
professional firms to perform all or portions 
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of the due diligence process (Van 
Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000). Since angel 
investors invest their own money (Benjamin 
& Margulis, 2000), they are less accountable 
than VCs, and their lack of rigor can lead to 
poorer investment decisions. 
Angels and VCs also differ in their motives, 
their entrepreneurial experience, and their 
expected involvement (Van Osnabrugge & 
Robinson, 2000). In general, angel investors 
are much more involved with the companies 
in which they invest than VCs, and are often 
involved more in day-to-day operations than 
VCs (Benjamin & Margulis, 2000). In the 
U.S., 87 percent of Angels have operating 
experience (Freear and Wetzel, 1991), while 
a typical VC has little or no operating 
experience (Van Osnabrugge & Robinson, 
2000). Angels typically have more 
entrepreneurial experience than VCs; 
research has shown that 75 to 83 percent of 
angels have start-up experience as compared 
to approximately 33 percent for VCs (Van 
Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000). Often, 
angels will work part-time, with periods of 
full-time commitment, to help entrepreneurs 
through challenging issues (Van Osnabrugge 
& Robinson, 2000). In fact, some angels are 
looking to work on a regular basis at their 
investments, whereas VCs rarely have the 
intention of being involved iri operations 
(Benjamin & Margulis, 2000). For these 
reasons, the angel investment often becomes 
more personal to both the investor and the 
entrepreneur. An angel investor is typically 
motivated beyond return on investment 
(ROI) (Benjamin & Margulis, 2000; Van 
Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000), while VCs 
primary reason for existence is ROI. VCs are 
in business to return a profit on the partners' 
investment, while angels enjoy helping 
another entrepreneur build a business and 
g1vmg back to the entrepreneurial 
community (Benjamin & Margulis, 2000; 
Van Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000). In 
summary, VCs are more objective with 
regards to financial return, less emotionally 
attached, and more interested in ROI. 
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The literature suggests that the entrepreneur 
is the most important factor when evaluating 
a start-up (MacMillan, Siegel, & 
SubbaNarasimha, 1985, MacMillan, 
Zemann, & SubbaNarasimha, 1987; Van 
Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000). Arthur 
Rock, a legendary venture capitalist, once 
said, "Nearly every mistake I've made has 
been in picking the wrong people, not the 
wrong idea" (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992, p. 
6). Both angels and VCs feel that the 
entrepreneur and the management team (Van 
Osnabrugge, 1998; MacMillan et al., 1987; 
Van Osnabrugge & Robinson 2000) are the 
two factors that attracts them to most deals. 
Macmillan, et al., (1985), for example, found 
that for VCs the quality of the entrepreneur 
ultimately determines the funding decision. 
Some literature suggests that angels are more 
attracted to the entrepreneur while VCs 
might be slightly more attracted to the idea 
(Van Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000). VCs, 
for instance, often feel they can attract better 
management to a deal if the deal is 
fundamentally sound (Van Osnabrugge & 
Robinson, 2000; Ehrlich, Noble, Moore, & 
Weaver, 1994; Harrison & Mason, 1992; 
Freear, Sohl, & Wetzel, 1997; Macmillan et 
al.). Timmons and Spinelli (2004) stated that 
the management team can make the 
difference in venture success. 
Some literature suggests the management 
team is the most important factor (Shepherd, 
1999; Dixon, 1991; Macmillan et al., 1987). 
Carter and Van Auken (1992) found the 
management team second only to the 
entrepreneur in a survey ofVCs consisting of 
27 investment criteria. Clearly, the 
entrepreneur and the management team are 
very important criteria for the investment 
decision for both angels and VCs. 
Understanding the entrepreneur and the team 
are important in evaluating how angels and 
VCs prioritize their investment criteria. 
Understanding what characteristics angel 
investors look for in the entrepreneur is the 
next step to understand the investment 
decision process. 
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Carter and Van Auken (1992) found that out 
of 27 investment criteria, VCs found 
entrepreneur's honesty ranked first, and 
entrepreneur's commitment ranked second. 
Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) 
performed a study of European start-up 
investments that showed enthusiasm and 
trustworthiness were ranked first and second, 
respectively out of twenty-seven investment 
criteria for angels-see table 1. 
Although VCs are more focused on a ROI 
for their limited partners, they still rank 
trustworthiness and enthusiasm higher than 
ROI. Coveney (1996) found that lack of trust 
reduces investment by angels. Timmons and 
Spinelli (2004) stated that the entrepreneur's 
commitment and determination are more 
important than any other factor when looking 
for successful entrepreneurs. Benjamin and 
Margulis (2000) stated that "Some investors 
are motivated by the passionate commitment 
of the entrepreneur. People committed to a 
venture can be persuasive; they have 
enthusiasm and solid entrepreneurial vision 
[p. 95]" Benjamin and Margulis (2000) 
combined the themes of passion, 
commitment, and enthusiasm. 
The themes of passion, commitment, and 
enthusiasm are used interchangeably 
throughout the literature (Coveney, 1996; 
Timmons & Spinelli, 2004, Benjamin & 
Margulis, 2000, Van Osnabrugge, 1998). 
Hence, this study treats them as the same 
construct relative to characteristics of the 
entrepreneur. 
In addition, Van Osnabrugge and Robinson 
(2000) found that expertise of the 
entrepreneur, liking the entrepreneur upon 
meeting, and track record were important 
characteristics of the entrepreneur. 
INTEGRATION AND RESEARCH 
QUESTION 
With little literature focusing on the angel 
investment process, and an estimated $22.5 
billion (Sohl, 2005) invested in 2005, it 
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Table 1- Van Osnabrugge Angel Investment Criteria 
Selected Investment Criteria Ranking 
Enthusiasm of the entreoreneur( s) 1 
Trustworthiness of the entreoreneur( s) 2 
Sales notential of the oroduct 3 
Ex.,..rtise of the entreoreneur( s) 4 
Investor liked the entrepreneur(s) upon meetin2 5 
Growth notential of the market 6 
Oualitv of product 7 
Perceived financial rewards (for investors) 8 
Niche market 9 
Track record of the entreoreneur 10 
Exnected rate of return 11 
Product's informal comoetitive orotection 12 
Investor's involvement oossible (contribute skills) 13 
Investor's stremrths fills 2aos in business 14 
Hi11:h mare:ins of business 15 
Low overheads 16 
Nature of competition 17 
Abilitv to reach break-even without further fundin2 18 
Low initial capital expenditures needed (on assets) 19 
Size of the investment 20 
Product's overall comoetitive orotection 21 
Low initial cost to test the market 22 
Venture is local 23 
Investor understands the business/industrv 24 
Potential exit routes Oiauiditv) 24 
Presence of (ootential) co-investors 26 
Formal competitive protection of oroduct <oatents) 27 
seems important to pursue empirical research 
in this area. A logical place to start is the 
understanding of how angel investors make 
their investment decision. Numerous studies 
have provided this same empirical research 
for VC investors, thus, the next step is to 
provide similar studies in the angel 
investment area. Therefore, this study will 
focus on providing empirical data regarding 
the U.S. angel investor decision process. To 
the author's knowledge, this is the first study 
to provide empirical data on how U.S. angel 
investors rank investment criteria. Van 
Osnabrugge (1998) provided empirical 
insight into the angel investment process in 
the U.K. Accordingly, the present study 
builds directly on the work of Van 
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Osnabrugge. As such, the research objective 
for this study is to identify U.S. angel 
investment decision criteria. A secondary 
objective of this study is to understand how 
U.S. angel investors prioritize their 
investment criteria. Thus: 
(Research Question): How do U.S. angel 
investors prioritize their investment criteria? 
STUDY OVERVIEW 
There has been little research on how angel 
investors select their investments (Elitzur & 
Gavious, 2003). Understanding how angel 
investors rank investment criteria and the 
relative importance of their perceptions will 
help us understand the investment process 
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better. The better we understand this process, 
the more likely we can improve angel 
investment process. 
This study utilized a two-phase approach to 
understanding how angels make their 
investment decisions. This two-phase 
approach consisted of a qualitative first 
phase and a quantitative second phase. The 
results of the first phase were intended to 
help inform the second phase and develop 
the quantitative instrument. (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Greene, Caracelli, & 
Graham, 1989). A participant-observer 
methodology was utilized in the first phase 
to collect data. In this case, the participant-
observer methodology involved the 
researcher personally observing and 
experiencing the angel organization as a 
member. Patton (2002) discussed six key 
advantages of the participant-observer 
methodology. First, direct observation allows 
the qbserver to understand and capture 
interaction between people in context. 
Second, it allows the observer to be open to 
new information and be more inductive, 
relying less on prior conceptualizations. 
Third, one can see things unfold that may 
routinely escape the people involved in the 
process. Fourth, the opportunity to learn 
things while observing that might not be 
uncovered in interviews: sometimes, people 
are less likely to discuss sensitive topics in a 
direct interview that may be observed in the 
natural setting. Fifth, the ability to gather 
data that is not biased by an interviewer's 
selective perceptions. Finally, the process of 
the observations allows the observer to draw 
on firsthand experiences during the formal 
interpretations stage of analysis and 
discussion. 
In the case of the current study, another 
advantage of the participant-observer 
methodology was complete access to the 
angel organization that the investors afforded 
to the investigator. This allowed a more 
natural observation versus an outsider to the 
organization. An outsider's results would not 
have been as accurate as members tend to 
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moqify their comments when outsiders are 
present. In addition, outsiders are not 
allowed access to certain portions of 
organization meetings due to legal issues 
related to disclosure of information. 
Accordingly the qualitative phase was 
intended to create understanding of how 
angels go about their investment process, 
what they discuss, what seems important in 
evaluating a start-up, and how they prioritize 
their investment criteria. Collecting data 
through this process helped to build the 
survey for the second phase of the study. 
The second phase was quantitative and 
consisted of surveying angels on what 
criteria they use to make an investment and 
how these criteria are prioritized. Existing 
literature was reviewed to identify any 
previously used questionnaires on angel 
investment criteria. This search identified 
one such instrument (Van Osnabrugge, 
1998). Accordingly, in the phase two 
quantitative investigation, a quantitative 
questionnaire was developed based on the 
phase one qualitative results and the Van 
Osnabrugge (1998) instrument. 
METHOD 
This study was based on observation and 
survey of members of Tech Coast Angels 
(TCA). TCA is the largest angel organization 
in the U.S. consisting of 173 angels, as of 
August 2004. TCA is located in Southern 
California. 
TCA members bring extensive and diverse 
experience and networking resources to the 
angel investment process. Since most of the 
members have been entrepreneurs, they can 
provide more than just a financial 
perspective to start-up companies. As an 
example, many can offer operating, 
marketing, sales, and engineering experience 
to the start-up company. 
TCA does not invest as a whole but, rather, 
each angel decides whether to independently 
invest. The typical minimum investment per 
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angel is $25,000, although some deals allow 
for lower amounts. As a whole, TCA 
typically provides funding in the range of 
$250,000 to $1,000,000 per venture. This 
financing garners from 10 to 40 percent 
ownership of the company. The terms of the 
transactions vary, but normally include 
preferred stock, automatic conversion to 
common stock at IPO, antidilution 
provisions, voting rights, and a board seat. 
As of August 2004, TCA had funded 81 
companies with $52, 707 ,836. In addition, 
these companies have received additional 
financing in excess of $536,633,332 from 
other sources. 
The decision to invest in a company is often 
affected by the impression the investor forms 
of the entrepreneur and the company in the 
initial meeting. This initial meeting is often 
called a screening. At a screening, the 
entrepreneur presents their company plan 
and answers questions for potential 
investors. The screenings consist of two 
distinct sections. The first section is the 
public portion which normally consists of the 
entrepreneur presenting a PowerPoint slide 
show for 15 minutes; the next 15 minutes are 
dedicated to open question and answers. The 
public section typically consists of four 
presentations by four different entrepreneurs. 
The second section consists of a private 
discussion where the angels discuss each 
presentation. This private portion provides 
the most enlightening observations. The 
angels effectively let down their guard 
during this discussion and speak freely about 
their perceptions of, concerns about, doubts 
about, and interest in the project. Two-
hundred, fifty-nine companies were observed 
at TCA screenings prior to the survey in 
August 2004. The qualitative phase was 
drawn from these screening observations. 
The quantitative phase consisted of a survey 
instrument that was developed to survey 
TCA members on how they rank their 
investment criteria. The instrument was 
developed based on themes that emerged 
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during the qualitative phase and the Van 
Osnabrugge instrument. 
In reviewing the Van Osnabrugge 
instrument, there were many items that 
appeared appropriate to retain. Items 
discussed in the TCA meetings that were 
already on the Van Osnabrugge instrument 
were retained. 
The next step was to delete items that did not 
seem appropriate for the TCA instrument. 
Based on the qualitative phase of the study, 
items were deleted based on their rarely 
being discussed in the screenings. In 
addition, some items were ambiguous, 
redundant, or did not apply. In addition, item 
terminology was modified to be more 
aligned with U.S. angel culture. These items 
were only edited, not removed. 
The last step was to add items that emerged 
in phase one of the study but were not on the 
Van Osnabrugge instrument. The most 
important item that was added was that of 
the "management team". In addition, "barrier 
for entry of competitors", and "advisors 
currently involved" were added. The 
instrument consisted of a Likert scale with 5 
being very important, and l being not 
important. 
A survey pilot was tested with handful of 
TCA members in July of 2004. After minor 
modifications for clarification, the survey 
was announced by the author at a monthly 
dinner meeting in August 2004. The survey 
was handed out to the dinner attendees and 
30 members filled out the survey at the 
dinner and handed it back upon exiting. Two 
emails regarding the survey were sent to the 
membership after the dinner to encourage 
more participation. The total sample size for 
the survey was 173. In total, 73 members 
responded, a response rate of 42 percent. 
One survey was eliminated due to the 
member not having made any investments, 
therefore final sample size was 72. 
RESULTS 
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Qualitative Results 
The purpose of the qualitative phase was to 
identify important decision criteria of angels 
that would be subsequently used in the 
quantitative phase. Common themes 
emerged from the observed screenings and 
associated discussions The angels 
consciously focus most of their time and 
energy on four main themes. These themes 
are: the passion of the lead entrepreneur; the 
trustworthiness of the lead entrepreneur; the 
quality of the management team; and the 
existence of an exit strategy or liquidity 
potential for the investor. 
Passion 
Passion and commitment of the entrepreneur 
emerged as the most important criterion. 
Investors look for entrepreneurs who show 
passion. Entrepreneurs who demonstrated 
this quality typically received more interest 
than ones who may have had a better 
business model or product but lacked 
passion. If the entrepreneur lacked passion or 
enthusiasm, investors appeared to be less 
interested. This may be due to the perception 
that start-up success is so difficult that 
entrepreneurs without great commitment and 
enthusiasm might be less likely to succeed. 
In the angel's mind, it appeared that 
commitment and passion would translate into 
business success. 
Angels seemed particularly interested in 
whether the entrepreneur was passionate and 
committed to do whatever it takes to work 
through all of the problems of a start-up to 
succeed. Angels found entrepreneurs with 
passion and commitment more engaging and 
interesting. One entrepreneur that embodied 
this kind of passion was a financial services 
start-up that provided prepaid credit cards. 
While the entrepreneur did not have any 
actual financial services experience, he 
showed high energy enthusiasm that 
impressed the angels. In addition, he had 
made reasonable money in past careers and 
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had put up most of his money, including 
mortgaging his house, to start the company. 
The passion and perceived commitment of 
this financial services entrepreneur garnered 
excitement from the investors. 
Trustworthiness 
From the angels' perspective, each 
interaction between the entrepreneur and the 
angels is an opportunity to build or break 
down trust. The richest content on this point 
surfaced when the entrepreneurs were out of 
the room. Some entrepreneurs benefited 
when they admitted that they did not have an 
answer to a specific question but would get 
the answer later. Others appeared to 
obfuscate, giving the angels sly answers. 
Generally, the angels agreed that if the 
entrepreneur was avoiding the question, he 
or she might not be able to be trusted. The 
entrepreneur failing to listen to the question 
was problematic in its own right. In addition, 
entrepreneurs who appeared to provide • 
contradictory answers lost credibility and 
trust. Some angels clearly stated they did not 
trust a particular entrepreneur based on their 
answers to questions and had no further 
interest no matter how appealing the 
business proposition was. A lack of trust 
would often cancel out any of the business 
idea's merits, growth potential, or ROI 
potential in the minds of the angel investors. 
The entrepreneur has to be trustworthy. 
Management Team 
In the private portion of the discussion, 
questions would often emerge as to whether 
the management team was appropriate for 
the project. This discussion typically 
centered on whether all of the pieces of the 
management team were in place. The 
entrepreneur was not expected to be able to 
do everything. However, the angels did 
expect the entrepreneur to know what the 
shortcomings of the current team were, and 
what team members needed to be added. 
As they did with the entrepreneur, the angels 
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looked for passion and commitment in the 
team. A team that appeared to have passion, 
commitment, and an understanding of their 
individual roles was a plus. In addition, on a 
few occasions, a team that was part of a 
previous successful team was a highly 
regarded characteristic. For instance, a team 
that had success building a product and was 
then acquired by a large company was 
perceived as a winning combination. 
While angels were less concerned about the 
team being in place for start-ups that were 
not very far along, they often asked 
questions to uncover whether the 
entrepreneur knew what type of team was 
needed for success. Accepting that the 
management team is an important attribute, 
the next step is to understand what 
characteristics of the management team are 
important to the angel investor. Coachablity 
of the team was one primary theme that was 
discu~sed. Teams that were perceived as not 
coachable were less likely to advance to due 
diligence phase of the process. Another 
aspect that was commonly discussed was the 
commitment of the team. This was often 
described as survivability. Investors liked 
teams that struggled through hard times and 
kept pursuing the venture. An example of a 
team that was considered to have high 
survivability was one that had been working 
their venture out of the garage for a long 
time to keep overhead low. The perception 
by the angels was that the team would do 
whatever it took to succeed. As with the 
entrepreneur, passion was discussed in 
relation to the team. Investors found that 
passion was not just necessary in the 
entrepreneur but in the team as a whole. 
Other themes that emerged were: experience 
of advisors, complementary skills of the 
advisors, track record of the individuals on 
the team, and experience of the team 
working together. 
Exit 
Angels primarily invest to receive a return on 
their money. Since angel investments usually 
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have a 4-6 year horizon (Mason & Harrison, 
2002), and return is typically only attained 
through an exit or liquidity event, angels 
seek ventures that will grow and be attractive 
to acquirers or have the possibility of an 
initial public offering (IPO). Since IPO's are 
rare, angels are very interested in learning 
who the potential acquirers may be for a 
particular venture. While observing 
entrepreneur presentations at TCA, it was not 
uncommon to observe a start-up that had 
already demonstrated profitability, had a 
solid business plan, and was led by an 
entrepreneur with a proven track record but 
did not gamer much interest due to an 
unclear exit path. 
In one example, a company had clearly 
identified potential acquirers and a potential 
sale price of the firm. Included in this were 
the potential returns the investors could 
receive from various acquirers upon 
liquidation. In addition, this entrepreneur had 
been part of a company that was built and 
sold within the industry, so he understood 
who would be interested, why they would 
want to purchase a company, and 
approximately how much they would invest. 
Again, since angels can only attain a return 
on their investment through a liquidity event, 
there is often a focus on who and why 
someone would want to purchase the start-
up. The main theme for angels was seeing 
how the start-up reached an exit. The general 
feeling was if there is good growth in the 
company and there are likely exit paths, then 
the ROI will come. 
In yet another example, a company did not 
have any information on exit in their 
presentation. When the entrepreneur was 
asked about their exit path, he responded "I 
believe we can do an IPO". This statement 
yielded strong feelings in the post-
presentation discussion among angels. An 
IPO is such a rare event, that it caused angels 
to feel that the entrepreneur had not thought 
about a viable exit plan. Watching this 
process helped make it clear that the best 
business plan or idea might not be perceived 
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as the best investment. 
Other Themes Identified 
Throughout observation of the screenings, 
many other themes emerged. These included: 
barrier to entry of competitors; intellectual 
property; growth potential; competition; 
profitability; what advisors were involved; 
domain knowledge of the investor similar to 
the start-up; and ROI. However, these 
themes were not as consistent nor did they 
carry the intensity of the four themes 
mentioned above. Also, some investors 
focused on specific criteria across all 
screening candidates. For instance, one 
investor asked nearly every entrepreneur 
how much of their own money was invested. 
When this investor was absent from a 
screening, this question was not consistently 
asked. Some investors often focused on 
functional areas of the business such as 
finance, marketing or on intellectual 
property. This was often due to their 
professional background. For example, 
someone who had a finance background 
might focus on issues related to the financial 
projections. In addition, through interviews, 
it was uncovered that some investors were 
biased towards certain criteria based on 
previous investment success or failure. For 
instance, one investor focused on 
understanding the competition, since he had 
previous investments fail due to competitor 
issues. 
Quantitative Results 
The results of the quantitative phase confirm 
the results in the qualitative phase, with 
trustworthiness ( 4.81 ), management team 
(4.64), enthusiasm (4.63), and exit (4.53) 
ranking as the top four criteria (5 being very 
important, l being not important). These 
results were expected based on the 
qualitative phase, however, there were no 
significant differences between the top 4 
items and the next items in the survey. 
With the exception of the "management 
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team" item which was added for the 
purposes of this study, the results are similar 
to those of Van Osnabrugge (1998) which 
found enthusiasm ranked first, and 
trustworthiness ranked second. This study's 
results showed enthusiasm ranked third, and 
trustworthiness ranked first. The 
management team ranked second in this 
study. In addition, exit, which emerged as a 
top theme in the qualitative portion of the 
study, ranked fourth in the survey. Van 
Osnabrugge found exit to be twenty-fourth. 
Table 2 shows the ranking of the survey 
items. 
Most venture capital literature shows the 
management team ranking high m 
investment criteria. This study shows the 
management team ranked second and, thus, 
is an important investment criterion. The 
literature lacks detail on which attributes of 
the management team are important. This 
study shows passion ( 4. 71 ), survivability 
(4.42), and openness (4.33) of the team are 
the top 3 criteria for the management team. 
Table 3 shows the items and ranking of the 
management team. 
The sample was predominately male 
(males=68, females=4). Since there were 
only four females in the study, no analysis 
was performed related to gender differences. 
The mean age of the investors was 53.7 
(N=70). Forty-nine angels had started a 
business with a minimum of five employees 
and stayed in business for at least three years 
(N=69). The mean level of education was 
2.83 (N=72, 1 =high school diploma, 2= 
bachelors degree, 3=masters degree, 4=PhD). 
The distribution of the highest degree 
completed were as follows: 11 PhDs, 41 
Masters, l 7 bachelors, and three high school 
diplomas. The mean number of face to face 
meetings the angels have with the 
entrepreneurs before making an investment 
were 6.02 (N=66). Angels were asked what 
percentage of investments do they have 
domain expertise. The results show that they 
have domain expertise in 54 percent of their 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Journal of Small Business Strategy Vol. 17, No. 2 Fa/I/Winter 200612007 
Table 2 - Results of Investment Criteria (N=72) 
Rank of 
Rank of Current Van 
Investment Criteria Study Mean STD Onsabrugge 
Trustworthiness/honesty of the entrepreneur(s) I 4.81 .399 2 
Management Team 2 4.64 .657 NIA 
Enthusiasm/commitment of the entrepreneur( s) 3 4.63 .592 I 
Potential exit routes (potential liquidity) 4 4.53 .712 24 
Revenue potential 5 4.47 .581 3 
Domain expertise of the entrepreneur(s) 6 4.44 .603 4 
Growth potential of the market 7 4.29 .701 6 
Return on Investment (ROI) 8 4.26 .805 II 
Barrier for entry for competitors 9 4.19 .781 NIA 
Product's overall competitive protection (in market segment) 10 4.11 .815 21 
Profit margin of the business II 4.08 .746 15 
Track record of the entrepreneur(s) 12 4.00 .839 10 
Competition of market segment 13 3.94 .785 17 
Liked entrepreneur(s) upon meeting 14 3.90 .922 5 
Product 's formal competitive protection (patents) 15 3.56 .933 27 
Your personal knowledge of the business/industry 16 3.53 .822 27 
Ability to maintain low overhead 17 3.46 1.020 18 
Potential of co-investors present 18 3.44 1.033 18 
Advisors currently involved 19 3.40 .899 NIA 
Niche market 20 3.31 1.121 9 
Size of the investment 21 3.26 .769 20 
Ability to reach break-even without further funding 22 3.24 1.000 18 
Low initial capital expenditures needed (i.e. on assets) 23 3.22 .996 22 
Investor's (your) strengths fill gaps in business 24 2.92 1.017 20 
Ability for involvement possible (contribute skills) 25 2.85 .914 13 
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Table 3 - Results of Management Team Criteria (N=72) 
Item Rank Mean STD 
Passion of the team 1 4.71 .568 
Perceived sense of survivability of the team (how persistence 2 4.42 .707 
they will be without civing up) 
Openness of team for mentoring ( coachabiltv) 3 4.33 .628 
Track record of individual team members 4 4.04 .759 
How comolementarv the skills of the team are 5 3.87 .691 
Exoerience of the advisors 6 3.67 .888 
How much experience the team has working together 7 3.22 .826 
investments (N=66, low= IO%, high =100%). 
The mean number of investments made were 
I 0.54 (N=72, low= I, high=50). Of those 
investments, 48% had no exit yet, 32% had a 
negative return, and 20% had a positive 
return (N=71). Analysis was performed to 
see if there was a relationship between 
investment experience (based on number of 
investments) and criteria rankings. This 
analysis showed no significant relationship 
between investor experience and criteria 
rankings. However, if we group number of 
investments by least experience (up to 5 
investments), medium experience ( 6-15 
investments), and most experience (over 15 
investments), "honesty" was rated as very 
important by 71 percent of least experienced 
investors, 82 percent of those with medium 
experience, and 93 percent of those with the 
most investing experience. Only 58 percent 
of least experienced investors rated 
enthusiasm as highly important criterion, 
compared to 71 percent for investors with 
more than five investments. The mean year 
for starting investing was 1991 (oldest 1971, 
most recent 2004, N=72). The mean total 
investment amount per angel was $1,610,363 
(N=69). However, there were three total 
investment amounts of $25,000,000, 
$20,000,000, and $18,000,000, which were 
angels who also do VC investing. If we 
remove these investments, the mean total 
investment amount per investor was 
$729,015 (N=66). Again, analysis was 
performed to see if there was a relationship 
between investment experience (based on 
investment amount) and criteria rankings. 
This analysis also 
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showed no significant relationship between 
investor experience and criteria rankings. 
The mean years to expected liquidity were 
5.25 years (N=72). Angels were asked to 
weight the importance of motivation based 
on three categories. The means were 62.85% 
for return on investment, 21. 70% for helping 
build companies, and 15.45% for mentoring 
entrepreneurs (N=71). 
DISCUSSION 
The primary focus of this study was to 
identify US angel investment decision 
criteria. Secondary focus was to understand 
how U.S. angel investors prioritize 
investment criteria. There has been little 
empirical research that provides insight on 
how U.S. angel investors rank their 
investment criteria (Wetzel, 1987; Harr, 
Starr, & MacMillan, 1988). 
Confirming the results of the qualitative 
phase of the research, the most important 
findings in the quantitative phase were that 
TCA Angel investors rank trustworthiness, 
enthusiasm, and the management team high 
in their investment criteria. As such, this 
study showed results similar to the Van 
Osnabrugge (1998) survey. Greater 
understanding of how investors prioritize 
their investment criteria will allow us to 
build better due diligence processes and 
potentially improve the overall investment 
process and resulting outcomes. 
This study brings new information to light 
with regard to how important the 
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management team is to the investor. There is 
much research which has focused on the 
entrepreneur. It seems logical that the 
entrepreneur may be the single most 
important member of the management team. 
However, the team is usually very important 
to the success of a new venture. 
Understanding more about how investors 
perceive a good management team will help 
us understand the investment process in 
more depth. This study showed that the 
combination of passion and commitment was 
the most important ingredient for the 
management team from the investor point of 
view. This result makes sense since 
enthusiasm of the entrepreneur ranked third 
in the investment criteria. Clearly, investors 
feel that passion is necessary to attain 
success. This can be explained by the often 
grueling and difficult process entrepreneurs 
go through to build a company. A 
management team without strong passion 
may not have enough drive to go the long 
haul. The second attribute for a management 
team is survivability. This goes hand-in-hand 
with passion. A successful management team 
of a start-up needs to have passion for what 
they are doing and strong drive to survive the 
challenges they will encounter. This finding 
supports the need to further understand the 
soft side of the investment process. 
Trustworthiness, enthusiasm, passion of the 
team, and sense of team survivability are all 
qualitative aspects of investment criteria. 
The results of this study differ from the Van 
Osnabrugge (1998) survey in a number of 
ways. Since there is little literature 
comparing US and U .K. angel investors, we 
cannot draw any clear conclusion regarding 
the distinctions. However, a few differences 
between this study and the Van Osnabrugge 
( 1998) survey should be noted. Although this 
survey consisted of only 72 angels from one 
angel organization, it is the first U.S.-based 
angel investment criteria survey. It might not 
be possible to generalize this organization to 
all U.S. angels; however, since the angels of 
this organization invest independently of 
each other and are from diverse 
Vol. 17, No. 2 Fall/Winter 200612007 
backgrounds, some generalizabilty may be 
suggested. Two items which were rated near 
opposite ends of the scale by U.S. and U.K. 
angels were "Potential exit routes" and 
"Liked entrepreneur upon meeting". U.S. 
angels rated "Potential exit routes" at fourth, 
while U.K. angels rated it twenty-fourth. A 
potential explanation for this may be a focus 
by U.S. investors on success in the 
investment process. If a new venture does 
not have a clear exit path, it is unlikely to be 
successful and bring any return to the 
investor. This may also explain why U.S. 
angels rated "Liked entrepreneur upon 
meeting" fourteenth, while U .K. angels rated 
it fifth. The perception of TCA investors is 
that almost all of the deals funded are 
expected to need venture capital investment. 
The venture capital model typically allows 
for the entrepreneur to be replaced. It is 
possible that TCA investors are not 
concerned whether they like the 
entrepreneurs but whether they can be 
trusted and if the venture is likely to be 
successful. In addition, angels who are part 
of a formalized investment association may 
be more likely motivated by ROI rather than 
mentoring entrepreneurs or building 
companies. Additional, albeit weaker, 
support for this assertion is that this study 
showed ROI ranked eighth by U.S. angels 
and eleventh by U.K. angels. 
There are many potential logical steps 
beyond this study. First, a larger sample 
could be attained to verify the findings here. 
Second, the top criteria could be studied in 
more depth. Understanding how investors 
form their perceptions of these top criteria 
may allow us to develop a better process in 
evaluating these constructs. Third, a 
longitudinal study could be initiated that 
tracks investments and how investors rank 
these criteria to see if there are any 
correlations with the investment criteria and 
success in the venture. Due to many external 
forces that may lead to start-up failure such 
as market shifts, government regulations 
changes, and unanticipated competitor 
moves, developing a high correlation 
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between investment criteria and success may 
prove to be difficult. 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
There are practical implications for both 
entrepreneurs and investors in this study. 
First, entrepreneurs need to realize that a 
good idea alone is not enough to obtain 
funding. How an entrepreneur manages the 
presentation to investors, answers questions, 
and facilitates the relationship through the 
process will have an impact on securing 
funding. Second, entrepreneurs need to build 
a management team that investors are willing 
to trust and invest in. It is important that the 
entrepreneur communicate about the team to 
the investors. Third, entrepreneurs need to 
clearly communicate an exit strategy for 
investors so that they can see an eventual 
return on their investment. Fourth, investors 
need to be aware how faulty first impressions 
can be in the initial stages of meeting an 
entrepreneur. Jumping to conclusions on 
how trustworthy and passionate the 
entrepreneur is needs to be evaluated through 
the due diligence process. Angels tend to 
spend most of their time in the due diligence 
process evaluating the quantitative side of 
the deal; more time spent on the qualitative 
side, or soft side, might lead to better 
investments. Angel investors should consider 
utilizing new techniques to evaluate the soft 
side of the deal rather than just their gut 
feeling. Effective human capital assessment 
tools appear not to be prevalent in the start-
up area, therefore, more rigorous interview 
techniques and entrepreneur background 
reviews may be helpful. 
LIMIT A TIO NS 
The major limitation of this study is the fact 
that only one angel investing organization 
was surveyed. Although TCA is one of the 
largest angel organizations in the country 
and, therefore, may be a good sample for 
predicting the behavior of the U.S. angel 
population, extending the survey to other 
organizations and individual angel investors 
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would increase the power of the study. Also, 
inherent in any self-reported survey is the 
issue of accuracy and bias. It is possible that 
some investors may have biased their 
answers to a more socially acceptable 
orientation. As with any self-reporting 
survey there is no opportunity to verify the 
accuracy of the responses. In addition, the 
participant-observer process utilized in the 
qualitative phase can be susceptible to bias, 
inaccurate perceptions, and selective 
perceptions. 
CONCLUSION 
This study addresses an important gap in 
current academic literature on angel 
investors. This study surveyed U.S. angel 
investors to help understand how they 
evaluate and prioritize their investment 
criteria. This study highlights the importance 
of the passion of the lead entrepreneur, the 
management team, trustworthiness of the 
lead entrepreneur, and a reasonable exit 
strategy as the most important ingredients for 
angel investors. This study takes the next 
step in understanding what angel investors 
are looking for from the management team. 
Passion, survivability, and openness to 
mentoring are the top three ingredients for 
the management team. 
A greater understanding of how angel 
investors make their investment decisions 
will allow them to review how their due 
diligence processes align with their 
investment decisions. This in turn will lead 
to a better investment process. Additionally, 
entrepreneurs will have a better 
understanding of what angel investors are 
looking for. 
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